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a b s t r a c t
A source to long-term increased catches and proﬁtability for the ﬁshing ﬂeet is the reduction of discards
and improvements in exploitation patterns. This article details the development of Norwegian regulatory
measures to this end, in particular the introduction of a discard ban and the Barents Sea programme of
real-time closures of ﬁshing areas. Actual beneﬁts of this policy are outlined.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
In order to improve exploitation patterns and reduce the problem of
discards in the ﬁsheries, Norway has over the years established a suite
of regulations andmanagement measures [1,2]. The main objective has
been to promote an exploitation pattern where ﬁsh below minimum
legal size are spared, and where unwanted bycatch can be minimised.
This has been achieved through several interconnected measures,
which can be referred to as the “Discard Ban Package”.
There are several causes or incentives for discarding [2–4],
including:
 juvenile ﬁsh; discarding of ﬁsh below minimum landing/
commercial size
 highgrading; ﬁlling scarce quotas with ﬁsh of size and quality
obtaining a higher price per kg
 lack of quota; discarding of species for which the vessel has
exhausted its quotas or exceeded bycatch limits
 too large catches; discarding the part of catch exceeding the
vessel’s processing or carrying capacity
 species of low value; discarding of bycatches of species of little
or no commercial value
 damaged ﬁsh; discarding of ﬁsh that is damaged or otherwise
unﬁt for human consumption.
The incentives for discarding may vary according to a range of
parameters such as e.g. ecosystem, size and age structure of target
stocks, season, gear type, available quotas and the regulatory frame-
work. Discarding is often regarded as a waste of living resources
[5,6]. Minimising unwanted bycatch that might otherwise be dis-
carded is relevant both to conservation and to economical and
distributional aspects of ﬁshing activities. The term “unwanted” may
in this context encompass bycatches of threatened species and
species without economic interest to the ﬁsher, as well as species
for which a particular ﬁsher or ﬂeet does not hold a quota or
ﬁshing right.
Norway introduced a discard ban on cod (Gadus morhua) and
haddock (Melanogrammus aegleﬁnus) in 1987 for both economic and
ethical reasons [7]. The very existence of the ban has been beneﬁcial
in changing the ﬁshers’ attitudes and discouraging the practice of
discarding. The ban was gradually expanded to new species, and
from 2009 an obligation to land all catches was introduced, albeit
with certain exemptions [8,9]. It should be noted that the ban
applies to dead or dying ﬁsh. Viable ﬁsh can be released back to
the sea.
The discard ban was preceded by a programme of real-time
closures of ﬁshing areas (RTCs) which evolved from 1984 and
onwards.
Area closures are well developed measures in ﬁsheries as well as
environmental management. An overview of the usage of area
restrictions, including Marine Protected Areas, in Norwegian ﬁsh-
eries management is available online [10]. In ﬁsheries management,
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closed areas can basically be grouped into two main cat-
egories: permanently closed areas and RTCs.
1.1. Permanently closed areas
Areas can be permanently closed year-round or seasonally, for all
gear or speciﬁc gear, and for a variety of reasons—nursery areas, coral
reefs, trawler-free zones to prevent conﬂicts between gear, lobster
habitats, etc. An example is the nursery area that is permanently
closed for bottom trawling year-round is the 20 nautical mile zone
around Bear Island, established in 1978 [11] (Fig. 1).
1.2. Real-time closures
RTCs are imposed temporarily on areas where the number of ﬁsh
below the minimum legal size or the level of bycatches exceeds
permitted limits. RTCs have turned out to be an effective tool
in situations where unwanted intermixture of ﬁsh varies from year
to year and/or with respect to time and place. As seen from the
ﬁshers’ perspective and that of economic efﬁciency, it is a ﬂexible
measure; unlike permanent closures, it allows ﬁshing to take place
in a controlled and sustainable manner when not in conﬂict with
economic and conservation objectives.
The programme for closing and opening of areas on a real time
basis in the Barents Sea was developed from 1984 and onwards to
prevent catching of ﬁsh below the minimum legal size or bycatches
of protected species. Similar but less comprehensive programmes
are now emerging for the North Sea and Skagerrak, in dialogue
between EU and Norway.
2. The Barents Sea programme for RTCs
The background for establishing this programme was that after
seven consecutive years with weak year-classes combined with
overly high ﬁshing pressure, the stock of Northeast Arctic (NEA)
cod was in very poor condition. However, in 1983 a strong year-class
of NEA cod was documented [12,13]. Experiences from the 1960s
and 1970s showed that strong year-classes would be grossly reduced
during their ﬁrst years of life owing to excessive discarding in the
trawl ﬁshery for Northern shrimp (Pandalus borealis), and during
subsequent years also in the trawl ﬁshery for cod and haddock. The
pressing question at that time was what would happen if there were
seven more lean years with poor recruitment of NEA cod after 1983.
Steps had to be taken immediately to ensure that this precious year-
class would survive and contribute to the spawning stock and to the
economically important cod ﬁsheries in the years to come. The
solution was the establishment of a programme for temporary RTCs
of ﬁshing grounds, a programme which between 1984 and 1986
successfully contributed to protecting the strong 1983 year-class
through its most vulnerable juvenile phase.
2.1. Financing and operation of the Barents Sea programme
In subsequent years the programme has been further developed,
and it now covers the most commercially important ﬁsheries in the
region. Commercial ﬁshing vessels are chartered to investigate the
ﬁshing grounds with specially assigned and trained inspectors on
board (most of them having their professional background from
ﬁsheries). The ﬁnancing of the programme is twofold. Until 2014 the
chartering of ﬁshing vessels was ﬁnanced by the industry, as a total
of 4600 t of cod, haddock and saithe (Pollachius virens) were set aside
from the total allowable catches, and given as quota bonus/payment
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Fig. 1. (A) Closed areas in March/April 2005. (B) Closed areas in October 2005. Solid
orange area: the permanent closed area around the Bear Island. Open red and green
areas: Real-time closures. Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.
P. Gullestad et al. / Marine Policy 54 (2015) 1–92
to ﬁshing vessels participating in the programme. As of 2014 the
chartering of vessels is still ﬁnanced by the industry, but now
through the income from a general fee on ﬁrsthand sales of ﬁsh.
The costs for 18 inspectors and the running of the programme, which
amount to approximately 20 million NOK or 2.7 million EUR per year,
are covered by the government (all data refer to 2012). The
programme is operated by the Surveillance Service, a branch of the
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries’ (DoF) regional ofﬁce in Tromsø.
The annual work plan of the Surveillance Service is based on risk
assessments that take into account not only expected ﬂeet activity,
but also research data on expected changes in stocks and year-class
strength. On this basis decisions are made concerning how many
days should be chartered on vessels of different categories over the
following year. Purchase of vessel days follows public tender pro-
cedures, and one important element in the selection is that the
vessels are representative of the relevant segment of the ﬁshing ﬂeet
with regard to gear technology, engine power etc.
2.2. Criteria for closures
Speciﬁc criteria relating to intermixture of juveniles and level of
bycatches are laid down in the relevant ﬁsheries regulations as basis
for closure [9]. In the Northern shrimp ﬁshery the criteria are a
maximum permitted number of specimens for each of the species
cod, haddock, redﬁsh (Sebastes spp.) and Greenland halibut
(Reinhardtius hippoglossoides) per 10 kg of shrimp. The present limit
is 8 for cod, 20 for haddock, and 3 each for redﬁsh and Greenland
halibut. The criteria for cod and haddock are based on the results
from a bio-economic model where the value of present shrimp
catches is balanced against future losses in economic yield of cod
and haddock [14]. The stocks of redﬁsh and Greenland halibut have
been in a precarious state for a long time, and for these species the
criteria are more restrictive, based on the precautionary approach
and biodiversity considerations. However, the situation for these
stocks has gradually improved during recent years, and the criteria
are presently being revised. Also the bio-economic criteria need to
be revised from time to time, due to changes in relative prices and
other relevant model parameters.
In the trawl ﬁshery targeting cod, haddock and saithe, a com-
bined maximum per haul of 15% juveniles (ﬁsh below their resp-
ective minimum sizes) of the said species are allowed. The
criterion is measured in numbers of ﬁsh. For inspectors and for
ﬁshers (Section 4.3 and the move-on provision), it is operationally
easier to count the ﬁsh than to weigh them. (Furthermore, a limit
measured in weight instead of numbers of ﬁsh would have to be
considerably higher than 15% to provide the same level of protec-
tion of juveniles). The 15% limit, based on biological considera-
tions, was introduced together with the RTC programme in 1984.
In addition to the criteria already mentioned, which are the most
important with respect to triggering RTCs, there are several other
bycatch criteria related to speciﬁc ﬁsheries or stocks, for example to
minimise the intermixture of cod in Barents Sea capelin (Mallotus
villosus) ﬁsheries, or the intermixture of protected redﬁsh in cod
ﬁsheries.
2.3. Procedures for closing areas—Notiﬁcation and communication
to the ﬂeet
Procedures have been established with regard to sampling and
delimiting the area to be closed. Accordingly, when investigations
by the Surveillance Service reveal that one or more criteria have
been exceeded, the area will be closed. Delimitation is based on
the actual geographical occurrence of juveniles or bycatches, not,
for example, on a predetermined grid size. As a consequence, a
closure may be quite extensive and non-rectangular in shape. The
formal decision on closure is made by the head ofﬁce of DoF in
Bergen in the form of a legally binding regulation, based on advice
from the regional ofﬁce in Tromsø. Normally, the regulations will
be adopted and enter into force within hours, not days, after
sampling took place.
The regulations are communicated in Norwegian to the ﬂeet
through the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, which has a daily
radio service that distributes short, important messages to the ﬂeet.
In addition regulations are communicated to the ﬂeet from relevant
coastal radio stations through channel 16. The regulations are also
published (in Norwegian, English and Russian) on the DoF website,
accompanied by a map of the closed area, the data on a haul by haul
basis from the trial ﬁshery that motivated the closure, and the
Surveillance Service’s summary/evaluation from the trial ﬁshery.
When an area is closed, it affects all ﬁshing vessels from the
moment they have received the relevant information. In the case of
foreign vessels, notiﬁcation must follow a formal procedure and go
through diplomatic channels. This may in practice take a week or
more. In order to speed up the process, by bilateral agreement, a
copy of the decision is sent simultaneously but informally from the
DoF to ﬁsheries authorities in Russia, EU, Faroe Islands, Iceland and
Greenland. However, normally the Coast Guard or the Surveillance
Service will inform vessels ﬁshing in the relevant area directly by
radio communication about the closure. If a foreign vessel continues
ﬁshing until it is notiﬁed by its own authorities, it is warned that it
may be inspected. Given that it is probably impossible to continue
ﬁshing without violating the rules, this warning usually results in
immediate compliance with RTCs, irrespectively of ﬂag and formal
notiﬁcation procedures. In situations with many ﬁshing vessels
present and high ﬁshing intensity, rapid closure and compliance
are essential for the protection of juvenile ﬁsh.
The decisions on relevant areas to investigate are based on accu-
mulated experience of the Surveillance Service, and on updated
information from scientists, the Coast Guard and the ﬁshing ﬂeet.
Closed areas are re-examined after some time to check whether it is
still motivated to have these closed. The time lag between closure
and re-examination is determined case by case based on experience
from similar situations. If the intermixture of juveniles in the catches
no longer exceeds the permitted levels, the closed areas are re-ope-
ned for ﬁsheries. In many cases the re-examination may justify an
amendment to the extent of the closed area. The number of closures,
amendments and re-openings depends primarily on the relative
strength of year-classes of relevant stocks, and ranges between 30
and up to 70, annually.
In advance of a closure, the Coast Guard has the possibility – if
present at the ﬁshing ground – of establishing a “Precautionary area”.
When set out in the map and communicated to the ﬂeet present, this
serves as a warning that ﬁshing in the speciﬁed area will most likely
imply violating regulations. The area is not formally closed, but ﬁshing
within the area might nevertheless have legal consequences.
Fig. 1A and B show the large variation in the size and shape of
closed areas, and also the major changes over time, here illustrated
by changes from March/April to October in 2005.
2.4. Stakeholder acceptance of RTCs
The concept of closure and opening of areas is generally regarded
– also within the industry – as an important instrument for achieving
rational exploitation patterns in these areas. Seen from a conserva-
tion perspective, no negative side effects have been observed with
regard to the method of closing areas with undersized ﬁsh or
excessive bycatch. As a regulatory measure RTC is, based on discus-
sions with stakeholders and the authors long personal experiences,
generally recognised and respected by ﬁshers, among whom it has
gained a fairly high degree of legitimacy. The reason for this is that
closing of areas with small ﬁsh or overly high bycatch levels creates a
level playing ﬁeld, and prevents behaviour that is contrary to ﬁshers’
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professional code of conduct, as ﬁshers in general accept that
catching (and discarding) ﬁsh below accepted minimum size is
unprofessional and morally wrong.
It has been argued that instead of formal closures, one could
rely on some sort of self-policing whereby ﬁshers would volunta-
rily leave areas with large numbers of juveniles. Although a move-
on provision does exist, see Section 4.3, experience shows that this
is not enough in practice. The law-abiding ﬁsher will perceive that
colleagues with a more relaxed attitude towards rules and regula-
tions continue ﬁshing and become the economic winners. When
high moral standards compete with economic return, the moral
standards tend to lose out. In such a context a formal closure
policed by the government creates a level playing ﬁeld.
From time to time ﬁshers complain that the Surveillance Service
is too slow in re-examining a closed area. This is mainly a question of
ﬁnding the right balance between ﬁshers’ understandable impa-
tience, and the concerns of government related to the cost/efﬁciency
of the Surveillance Service. Automatic re-opening of closed areas is
not considered feasible in the Barents Sea, as experience shows that
when intermixture of juveniles occurs, it may often prevail for a
long, indeﬁnite period (often months rather than weeks). Accord-
ingly, the occurrence of juveniles or bycatches must be assessed and
re-assessed in each individual case.
The rules of RTC programmes differ, due to differences both in
natural conditions in the objectives and ambitions set for the
programme. In the emerging RTC programme for the North Sea and
Skagerrak, EU and Norway have so far not managed to harmonise the
relevant rules and criteria. Both parties do apply automatic re-
opening after 14 days, but no agreement has yet been reached
concerning the size (predetermined or not) of closed areas and
whether limits should be measured in weight or numbers.
2.5. Co-operation with Russia
Several stocks in the Barents Sea are shared and managed jointly
between Norway and Russia as coastal states. In 1975 the two
parties established the Joint Norwegian–Soviet (Russian now) Fish-
eries Commission, and in 1976 a framework agreement on mutual
ﬁsheries relations was signed [15–17]. The Joint Norwegian–Russian
Fisheries Commission and its subcommittees meet regularly to
discuss and decide on management issues, including technical
measures. There is a common understanding that protection of
juveniles is an essential part of responsible management, and the
criteria and procedures for RTCs are jointly agreed. Both parties
have restrictions on discarding in their legislation.
3. The introduction of a discard ban in Norway
Returning to the strong 1983 year-class of cod: in late 1986 and
early 1987 this year-class reached what was then the minimum
landing size, and the basis for area closures was no longer present.
However, alarming messages from both inspectors and the ﬁshing
ﬂeet indicated that a practice involving extensive high-grading
was now emerging. Fishers would ﬁll their quotas with the largest,
best-paid ﬁsh and discard the smaller but still legally sized ﬁsh.
This behaviour was perfectly legal under the existing laws and
regulations.
As described above, considerable effort had already been put into
saving this particular year-class; furthermore, subsequent year-
classes were reported to be poor. The Minister of Fisheries at that
time, Mr. Bjarne Mørk-Eidem, was naturally very upset: “This is
terrible,” he said, and his experts answered: “Yes, Minister, it is really
terrible.” And he went on, saying: “We must do something; we have
to ban this practice.” But the experts said: “Ah, well—no, Minister,
that is not possible. There are all sorts of legal problems, not least
internationally. But ﬁrst and foremost, a discard ban is more or less
impossible to enforce.” However, the Minister refused to give in:
“This practice is both economic madness and morally wrong—I
know it, you know it, and so do the ﬁshers. Even if it is hard to
enforce, at least it should not be legal to do what they are doing.
Therefore, no more discussions; make me a discard ban!” (Bjarne
Mørk Eidem, pers. comm.). Subsequently, the ban on discard of dead
or dying cod and haddock came into force in April 1987 [7].
This story is an example of political leadership. When his
experts were stuck in conventional thinking, the Minister pointed
out the direction for a new and sustainable policy in this ﬁeld.
Over the next 20 years, the ban on discarding of dead or dying ﬁsh
was gradually extended to include new species, and by 2008 a total of
18 species were covered by the no-discard policy. On 1 January 2009
the old Act relating to Seawater Fisheries was replaced by a new
Marine Resources Act [8], and at the same time an obligation to land
all catch of ﬁsh (discard ban) was made the general norm. The earlier
Act related only to ﬁsheries and focused mainly on the exploitation of
commercial stocks, whereas the new Act applies to all living marine
resources. After initial adjustments the following years, the discard
ban comprises approximately 55 species by 2014 [9]. Some further
adjustments for species of low economic value could be expected in
order to adapt the discard policy to some of the practical problems
encountered by the ﬁshing ﬂeet.
3.1. Enforcement and sanctions of the discard ban
Discarding is an offence that may be difﬁcult to detect. None-
theless, enforcement of regulations concerning the obligation to
land catches has high priority, and the Coast Guard and the
Directorate of Fisheries do detect some cases each year.
Presence and surveillance at sea by the Norwegian Coast Guard is
extensive compared to most coastal states, with 15 inspection
vessels conducting in the order of 2000 inspections annually.
Presence and inspection at sea are the main tools for preventing
and uncovering discarding. Some of the inspection vessels are
equipped with a helicopter, and “surprise” ﬁlming for evidence
followed by boarding has proved effective in uncovering discarding.
Norway does neither operate an observer programme collecting
scientiﬁc data at sea, nor a closed-circuit television (CCTV) pro-
gramme to monitor potential discarding. However, scientiﬁc data,
including some data on discards, are collected by the Institute of
Marine Research through their Reference ﬂeet [18].
When discarding is revealed, both the captain of the vessel and
the owner may be ﬁned. In extreme cases, for example if it is
revealed that discarding is an integral part of the vessel’s ‘ordinary’
production process, the ﬁshing licence may be withdrawn for a
period, and considerably higher ﬁnes are expected than for minor
infractions. In blatant cases, depending on the evidence, the entire
catch onboard may be considered illegal, and a corresponding value
conﬁscated by the prosecuting authority or by the court, in a
separate decision. Over the years, the Coast Guard, in co-operation
with the Public Prosecutor, has succeeded in learning how to collect
evidence in discard cases in a way that will satisfy the Norwegian
judicial system, so that it is possible to get convictions in a Court of
Law. As a result, approximately half a dozen captains/companies are
ﬁned annually. The ﬁnes are around 15 000 to 25 000 NOK for the
captain, and in addition up to 150 000 NOK for the company that
owns the vessel.
3.2. What about damaged ﬁsh—Are there any exceptions to the
discard ban?
The regulations relating to seawater ﬁsheries [9], list the species
for which the discard ban applies. Neither the act nor the regulations
include any formal exemptions from this ban. However, in practice it
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is not possible to avoid all situations where ﬁsh are damaged to an
extent where they are no longer ﬁt for human consumption.
Examples include ﬁsh stuck in meshes and ﬁsh that have been
partly consumed by other marine organisms. Retaining such ﬁsh on
board may result in practical problems. However, the amount of ﬁsh
damaged in this way during a ﬁshery conducted in accordance with
all applicable regulations is very low. The authorities have thus
acknowledged that these practical problems have to be dealt with.
Recognising that it is not possible to list all situations and set limits
in a regulation that will give the desired result, the authorities have
found a pragmatic solution. Under the Norwegian legal system, the
enforcement agencies have the authority to decide whether an
infringement should be followed up. Based on this authority, it has
become a practice for the enforcement agencies not to prosecute
discarding of ﬁsh that are provable damaged in ﬁshing operations,
and thus unﬁt for human consumption. This also applies to the
amount of waste resulting from ﬁsh production on board vessels
according to the ofﬁcial conversion factors, and to the smallest
juvenile ﬁsh not being sorted out by the sorting grid in a shrimp
trawl, as long as the number of juveniles per kg of shrimp caught is
within the legal limit.
4. Accompanying measures to facilitate the discard ban
A commonly asked question with regard to the Norwegian
discard policy is how to handle all the ‘illegal’ catches that are
now supposedly landed. Questions like this tend to overlook the
combined set of measures that lie at the core of the policy. The
discard ban, the obligation to change ﬁshing ground, RTCs, the
tailoring of quota regulations, gear restrictions and minimum ﬁsh
and mesh sizes, and the development of more selective gear—all
these measures aim at reducing the amount of unwanted catches in
the ﬁrst place. The accompanying measures are discussed below.
4.1. Compensation to ﬁshers for landing of ‘illegal’ catches
Although there is no doubt that the extent of unwanted catches in
Norwegian ﬁsheries has been greatly reduced, it is a fact, supported by
detected cases, that discarding still occurs. Sometimes it occurs
deliberately and as a result of an intended and unlawful harvest
strategy, but sometimes to dispose of an unintentional bycatch. As an
incentive to land the unintended catch instead of discarding it, ﬁshers
may apply for compensation for the extra work of handling and
landing the ﬁsh. The ‘illegal’ catches may be sold together with the
rest of the catch and through ordinary market outlets. However, as all
ﬁrsthand sales and all payments for ﬁsh are by law [19] channelled
through one of the six Norwegian ﬁshermen’s sales organisations, the
value of the ‘illegal’ part of the catch is retained by the sales
organisation. Nevertheless, 20% of the value of the ‘illegal’ catch may
be paid to the ﬁsher as compensation for any extra work. In purse
seine ﬁsheries for mackerel, herring and capelin, this 20% rule was
abandoned as it turned out to be too strong an incentive for vessels to
exceed their quota by “ﬁlling up” on the last trip.
The sales organisations are allowed to keep the conﬁscated 80%
of the value, and use the money on their lawful duties related to
ﬁsheries control, which include the collection and revision of all
data related to ﬁrsthand sales of ﬁsh in Norway.
Generally, the landings of ‘illegal’ ﬁsh do not represent a large
amount of ﬁsh or a signiﬁcant logistical problem. However, some
challenges have been encountered by ﬁshers who comply with the
discard ban and land certain species with little or no market value.
The occasional and unintended bycatch of polar cod (Boreogadus
saida) in the Northern shrimp ﬁshery is an example. Such catches
may be ensiled and reduced to meal and oil, or used for animal
feed. As such catches represent small and occasional volumes,
there has been no direct effort triggered by discards to develop
new markets. Over the years there have, however, been several
initiatives to develop new ﬁsheries and markets for hitherto
underutilized species. Some of these species has historically been
discarded as low value bycatch.
4.2. From minimum landing sizes of ﬁsh to minimum ﬁshing sizes of
ﬁsh
Historically, an important element when deciding on minimum
mesh sizes in bottom trawl has been the objective of utilising the
growth potential of the individual ﬁsh, and letting each ﬁsh spawn at
least once before it is caught [20]. The minimum landing sizes of ﬁsh
have often been set at levels where on average 75% of the ﬁsh below
that size are expected to swim through the meshes, whereas 25% are
captured (and discarded if the minimum landing size is enforced).
The introduction of a discard ban led to a conceptual change with
regard to the interpretation and function of permissible minimum
sizes of ﬁsh. The minimum sizes of the ﬁsh that are actually ﬁshed
have replaced the minimum landing sizes in technical regulations;
for example, ﬁshing sizes are crucial elements in the decision rules
for RTCs. The focus on reduction of potential discards has also been
an invitation to revisit – and if possible harmonise or improve – the
connection between mesh sizes, allowed minimum ﬁsh sizes and the
actual commercial minimum market sizes. For targeted ﬁsheries, for
example, there is no obvious reason why it should be legally
permissible to take ﬁsh that are smaller than what is commercially
accepted in the market. Hence, the option of increasing the minimum
mesh size in trawls accordingly should be considered. For mixed
ﬁsheries the situation is, admittedly, more complex.
4.3. Obligation to change ﬁshing ground—The move-on provision
when limits on juveniles or bycatches are exceeded
According to Norwegian legislation, it is prohibited to ﬁsh ‘illegal’
ﬁsh, as distinct from a prohibition that merely limits the landing of
such ﬁsh. This prohibition constitutes an obligation for ﬁshers to
change ﬁshing ground when the ﬁshing operations contravene the
regulations. For instance, whenever bycatch limits or the permitted
intermixture of undersized ﬁsh have been exceeded, the ﬁshing
operation on the ﬁshing ground in question must cease and opera-
tions must move to an area where, to the best of the ﬁsher’s
knowledge, it is probable that the catch composition is within the
limits of the relevant regulations. It is not expedient within the
Norwegian legal system to stipulate a ﬁxed shift in terms of depth or
distance in nautical miles. If the logbook, satellite tracking or other
sources of information reveal that more than one haul has been
conducted in the same area without moving, the ﬁsher will be
subject to arrest/reporting to the police and may be ﬁned for the
offence. The catch in the relevant hauls is considered illegally caught,
and its value conﬁscated by the prosecuting authority or the court in
a decision separate from the ﬁne. If illegal catch is mixed with legal
catches on board the vessel, the entire catch may be considered
illegal and its value conﬁscated.
If the ﬁsher has acted in compliance with the move-on provision,
there is no offence. The value of the part of the catch that is in excess
of permitted limits will, however, be subject to conﬁscation through
an administrative decision by the DoF.
It should be noted that it is a crucial element of the anti-discard
policy that ﬁshing operations are recorded in logbooks on a haul
by haul basis.
4.4. Tailoring of national quota regulations
Different ways of regulating ﬁsheries by means of quotas may
provide different incentives with regard to discarding. As a
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consequence of the introduction of a discard ban, the government was
forced to re-think its practices, not only in terms of technical
regulations, but also with regard to national quota regulations. It
was important to ensure that the regulations were formulated to
minimise possible incentives to discarding, such as quotas per trip or
week. Weekly quotas face the ﬁsher with a weekly temptation to
discard excess catches in the last haul, whereas annual quotas limit
that temptation to once a year.
Another important measure was to allocate quotas to cover exp-
ected unavoidable bycatches in non-direct ﬁsheries, before allocating
remaining national quotas to vessels licensed to target the species in
question. In addition the bycatch allocation must be reconciled with
the permissible bycatch limits, and the government must refrain from
“solving” distributional issues by implicitly accepting that ﬁshers
discard excess catches. Bycatch allocations are now common in many
Norwegian ﬁsheries; examples include allocation of North Sea cod to
cover unavoidable bycatches in saithe and in Northern shrimp ﬁsheries,
saithe in Norway pout (Trisopterus esmarkii) trawling, and blue whiting
(Micromesistius poutassou) in herring (Clupea harengus) ﬁsheries.
Small coastal vessels ﬁshing with passive gear have limitations in
terms of mobility and ability to change ﬁshing ground. In some of the
ﬁsheries carried out by these vessels, actual bycatches may vary
considerably from setting to setting or from day to day. In such cases,
bycatch limits may be set for a longer period, for example a week, to
reduce incentives to discard.
4.5. Development of selective gear technology
The focus on the discard problem and in particular the regulations
introduced to minimise the problem, have had a beneﬁcial inﬂuence
Fig. 2. (A) Sorting grid installed in a Northern shrimp (Pandalus borealis) trawl to separate and release ﬁsh from shrimp catches. (B) Sorting grid installed in a bottom trawl to
separate and release juvenile ﬁsh. Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.
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on the research and development of more selective ﬁshing gear. The
introduction of grid technology both in shrimp and cod trawls
(compulsory north of 621N from 1991 and 1997, respectively) are
examples of this spin-off effect created ﬁrst of all by the RTCs (see the
illustrations in Fig. 2A and B). The industry took an active part in this
development when large areas were closed due to too large inter-
mixtures of juveniles. With sorting grids still at a test stage, ﬁshers
could get an exemption to ﬁsh in closed areas, provided they used a
sorting grid. To this end closures turned out to be far more effective
and instrumental to innovation and implementation than years of
traditional, publicly ﬁnanced research on selectivity. The successful
use of grids in the test phase paved the way for the agreement
between Norway and Russia to make the use of grids compulsory
throughout the Barents Sea.
The introduction of the discard ban and RTCs has led to creative
pressure on research, management and industry to cooperate and
contribute to technical and regulatory innovations in order to
improve selectivity and reduce unwanted bycatches, and also to
reduce various sources of unintended ﬁshing mortality. One recent
example is the development of the Excess Fish Exclusion Device
which release ﬁsh to avoid too large catches in trawl and Danish
seine. With the sharp increase in stock and availability of cod,
burst nets and extensive non-registered ﬁshing mortality caused
by very large hauls in a short time, have become a problem. This
challenge is now about to be successfully solved in a constructive
co-operation between the industry, science and management [21].
5. Gains from improvements in the exploitation patterns
Below, Northeast Arctic cod is used to illustrate the potential
gains from improvements in exploitation patterns. Fig. 3 shows the
yield of NEA cod as a function of age-at-catch. With an initial stock
of 1000 three-year-old cod where all are caught immediately, the
total yield amounts to 724 kg live weight. If the catch is postponed
until the ﬁsh are nine years old, many of the initial 1000 ﬁshes
have died from natural mortality, but due to the individual growth
of the remaining ﬁsh, the total yield has nearly doubled to 1337 kg.
The ﬁgure illustrates a central and general point with regard to
potential gains from improvements in exploitation patterns.
Fig. 4 shows the dynamics in mean age- and weight-at-landing
from 1946 to 2013. In the 1970s the mean age-at-landing fell to
around 4 years when a strong year-class entered the NEA cod
ﬁshery, whereas from 1990 and onwards the mean age-at-landing
has not been below 5 years in spite of the entrance of several strong
year-classes in the ﬁshery. From 1946 to 1950 the mean age-at-
landing was higher than 7 years; in 2013 the mean age-at-landing
was above 7 years for the ﬁrst time since 1950. Mean weight-at-
landing was lowest in the 1960s and 1970s, and in these decades it
fell below 2 kg (see Table 1). From 2010 to 2013 the mean weight-at-
landing increased by more than 1 kg from 2.84 kg to 3.87 kg, and in
2013 the highest mean weight-at-landing after the Second World
War was reported. Table 1 illustrates how the selectivity in the NEA
cod ﬁshery in the Barents Sea deteriorated from the 1950s to the
1970s, but later improved due to the continuous and combined
efforts to improve exploitation patterns since the 1980s. Important
milestones in this regard are illustrated in Table 2.
According to data in a recent report [23], the mean age-at-landing
of NEA cod decreased from 5.9 years in the 1950s to around 5.3 years
in the 1960s and 1970s, and then increased again to 5.6–5.7 years
during 1990s and 2000s and to 6.8 years in the period 2010–2013.
The increase in the period 2010–2013 is due to both very low ﬁshing
mortalities (2010–2013: an average of 0.28 per year) and the
dominance of the strong 2004 and 2005 year-classes in the catches.
Based on data on growth, selection and cannibalism mortality from
the same report [23], the mean age-at-landing in 2014 when ﬁshing
at the target ﬁshing mortality of 0.40 per year, will be 6.5 years in an
equilibrium situation, compared to 6.9 years with the recent ﬁshing
mortality of 0.28 per year (Table 3.25 in [23], data for 2014).
The increase of 1.5 years in mean age-at-landing since the 1970s
represents – all other things being equal – an 18% increase in annual
yield. Applied to the total allowable catch of 1000 000 t for cod in
2013, this amounts to about 180 000 t and to a ﬁrsthand value of
approximately 1517 million NOK or 194 million EUR, based on the
average Norwegian ﬁrsthand prices in 2013. Although this calcula-
tion is based on simpliﬁed assumptions, it illustrates the substantial
gains that might accrue from improvements in exploitation patterns.
Also note that since this calculation is based on change in the
average age-at-landing, it does not include the gains reaped from
reduced levels of discards. In the absence of reliable data on
historical discard levels, these gains are not possible to calculate
separately. However, with knowledge of the history of the Barents
Sea ﬁsheries, and with reference to similar ﬁsheries where discard
data do exist [5,6], it is likely that these gains have been consider-
able. An earlier paper [24] showed that at a low ﬁshing pressure, the
gain in yield-per-recruit of NEA cod may be around 25% if exploita-
tion is postponed for two years.
Fig. 3. Yield-per-recruit of Northeast Arctic cod (Gadus morhua) as a function of
age-at-catch. The data in the ﬁgure have been calculated from catch weights-at-age
in 2010 given in Table 3.7 and natural mortality-at-age in 2010 used in the ﬁnal
separable virtual population analysis run given in Table 3.17 in [22].
Fig. 4. Mean annual age- (left y-axis) and weight-at-landing (right y-axis) of
Northeast Arctic cod (G. morhua) during the period 1946–2013. The calculations are
based on data from 1946 to 2013 in Tables 3.5 and 3.7 in [23].
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For ﬁshers and the ﬁshing industry, mean weight-at-landing is in
itself an important economic parameter and is also easier to relate to
thanmean age-at-landing. Both these measures show similar trends,
as seen in Table 1. From an average weight-at-landing between
1.6 and 2.6 kg in most of the decades between 1950 and 2009, the
mean weight-at-landing increased to 3.3 kg in the period 2010–
2013. Based on data on growth, selection and cannibalism mortality
[23], the mean weight-at-landing in 2014 when ﬁshing at the
present target ﬁshing mortality of 0.40 per year will be 3.1 kg in
an equilibrium situation, compared to 3.6 kg with the recent ﬁshing
mortality of 0.28 per year (Table 3.25 in [23], data for 2014).
6. Development of the spawning stock and total landings of
Northeast Arctic cod and haddock during 1980–2013
The development of the spawning stock biomass (SSB) and in
total landings may be used as indicators of the overall successfulness
of ﬁsheries management: SSB represents the stock fortune and total
landings the annual yield or income from that fortune. The devel-
opment of these two indicators is basically inﬂuenced by a combi-
nation of three factors: variability in environmental conditions, exp-
loitation pattern, and exploitation level. Fisheries management may
control the last two, but it is more than difﬁcult to adequately
separate the effect from each of the three factors. Besides resulting
in a substantial increase in annual yield, as illustrated above, the
discard management measures and improved exploitation patterns
have also, beyond reasonable doubt, made a valuable contribution to
the rebuilding of the two stocks.
With regard to the exploitation levels of the Barents Sea stocks
there has been a positive development during the last 5–10 years,
owing both to bringing an excessive illegal, unregulated and
unreported (IUU) ﬁshing under control, and to the introduction
of precautionary Harvest Control Rules, reducing the ﬁshing
mortality levels from 2007 and onwards.
The average annual spawning stock, landings and ﬁshing mor-
talities for Northeast Arctic cod and haddock in the two periods
1980–1989 and 2007–2013 are given in Table 3. The precautionary
approach reference points Bpa and Fpa, for SSBs and ﬁshing
mortalities, respectively, are included as references. All data refer
to the ICES Advice in 2014 [25,26].
For both stocks and particularly for cod, a signiﬁcant reduction
in ﬁshing mortality has been achieved since the 1980s. SSBs have
increased four to ﬁvefold for both stocks, giving room for large, but
nonetheless sustainable increases in total allowable catches.
7. Conclusions
The positive development in the Barents Sea ﬁsheries since the
1980s cannot be attributed to one or a few causes or measures. It has
been brought about by a suite of measures in combination with
favourable natural conditions [27,28]. The lesson learnt is that a
prudent management regime should give attention to and investi-
gate possible improvements both in exploitation patterns to provide
incentives for more selective ﬁshing, as well as in the levels of
exploitation [6,24,27,29]. Stakeholders’ acceptance of the change in
policy has grown over time, and it could optimistically be argued
that the success of these policy changes has led to changes in the
perception on how the ﬁsheries should be best exercised.
Table 1
Mean age- and weight-at-landing of Northeast Arctic cod (Gadus morhua) in different decades from 1946 to 2013 (source: [23]).
Mean age- and weight-at-landing of NEA cod in different decades
Decades 1946–1949 1950–1959 1960–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2009 2010–2013
Mean age-at-landing (years) 7.76 5.90 5.30 5.32 5.49 5.71 5.62 6.78
Mean weight-at-landing (kg) 3.20 2.13 1.63 1.88 2.23 2.60 2.36 3.33
Table 2
Important steps in improving exploitation patterns for Northeast Arctic cod (G. morhua) and haddock (Melanogrammus aegleﬁnus) during
1980–2013.
Year Milestones in improving the exploitation patterns in the Barents Sea
1980 Norwegian–Russian agreement to ban mid-water trawling for cod and haddock
1981 Norwegian–Russian agreement to increase minimum legal mesh size to 125 mm in bottom trawl
1982 Norwegian–Russian agreement on minimum legal sizes of 42 cm for cod and 39 cm for haddock
1983 Unilateral Norwegian increase of minimum legal mesh to 135 mm in bottom trawl
1984 Introduction of RTCs and the move-on provision in Norwegian waters
1987 Introduction of a discard ban for cod and haddock in Norwegian waters
1990 Unilateral Norwegian increase of the minimum legal sizes to 47 cm for cod and 44 cm for haddock
1991 Norwegian–Russian agreement on mandatory sorting grid (19 mm bar spacing) in Northern shrimp trawl
1997 Norwegian–Russian agreement on mandatory sorting grid (55 mm bar spacing) in bottom trawl
2010 Norwegian–Russian compromise on a joint minimum legal size of 130 mm in bottom trawl
2010 Norwegian–Russian compromise on joint minimum sizes of 44 cm for cod and 40 cm for haddock
Table 3
Development of spawning stock biomass (SSB), landings and annual ﬁshing
mortality (F) of Northeast Arctic cod (G. morhua) and haddock (M. aegleﬁnus)
during two periods from 1980 to 2013 (sources: [25,26]).
Species/SSB/landings/ﬁshing
mortality (F)
Time period Reference
values
1980–
1989
2007–
2013
NEA cod
Mean annual SSB (1000 t) 210 1376 460
Mean annual landings (1000 t) 374 643
Mean F—ages 5–10 0.82 0.29 0.40
NEA haddock
Mean annual SSB (1000 t) 69 296 80
Mean annual landings (1000 t) 71 227
Mean F—ages 4–7 0.42 0.35 0.47
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